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FEDERAL TAX IMPLICATIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:
DEALING WITH THE DEREGULATION LOSS
STEPHEN G. SALLEY*

On July, 1980, the Florida legislature repealed Chapter 323 of the Florida
Statutes,' terminating the state's pervasive regulatory control over motor carrier
operations. 2 The implications of this repeal are enormous, especially in light of
the trend toward deregulation continuing at all levels of government.3 The
federal tax implications generated by the deregulation process are of particular
significance, and should be considered by regulated industries in formulating
their strategies to combat deregulation.
Deregulation's chief effect is upon the process of governmental licensing.
The process of obtaining and maintaining governmental licenses and permits
or otherwise satisfying the administrative requirements of entry into a regulated industry will evaporate. Existing business licenses, permits, and other
evidences of governmental sufferance will become valueless, yielding tangible
income tax consequences to the deregulated industries.
In accordance with accepted business practices, expenditures made by
regulated enterprises to acquire necessary permits or licenses are treated as
assets. After deregulation, the loss of that asset should logically give rise to a
current deduction.4 That deduction may represent the taxpayer's only re*B.A., Harvard University, 1971; J.D., University of Florida, 1975; LL.M., University of
Florida, 1978. Member of The Florida Bar.
1. Repeal of this chapter was in accordance with the provisions of the Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976, FLA. STAT. §11.61(1979).
2. Chapter 323 of the Florida Statutes represented the legislative mandate for the regulation of motor carriage and shipping in the State of Florida. This chapter granted extremely
broad authority to the Florida Public Service Commission to oversee virtually every aspect of
that industry's operations, from the setting of rates to the establishing and harboring of minimonopolies for designated carriers over specified routes or for particular services. See text accompanying notes 5-7 infra.
3. The repeal of Chapter 323 is not likely to be an isolated event. The Florida Legislature
expressed its desire to systematically deregulate all economic activity. FLA. STAT. §11.61(2)(a)
(1979) states it is the intent of the legislature: "[t]hat no profession, occupation, business, industry, or other endeavor shall be subject to the state's regulatory power unless the exercise
of such power is necessary to protect the public health, safety or welfare from significant and
discernible harm or damage. The exercise of the state's police power shall be done only to
the extent necessary for that purpose." Other states and the federal government are becoming
increasingly sensitive to the burdens of regulation. To a large extent, such sensitivity was
caused by public dissatisfaction with the expense and perceived inefficiency of countless
bureaucracies.
4. Reg. §1.165-2(a) provides: "A loss incurred in a business or in a transaction entered
into for profit and arising from the sudden termination of the usefulness in such business or
transaction of any nondepreciable property, in a case where such business or transaction is
discontinued or where such property is permanently discarded from use therein, shall be
allowed as a deduction under section 165(a) for the taxable year in which the loss is actually
sustained." (emphasis added).
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coupment for the often substantial sums spent on administrative permitting.
No license resale market remains after deregulation. Consequently, the deregulated taxpayer is faced with a true economic loss which can only be recovered through a reduction of taxable income.
The deductibility of the loss, however, may not be as indisputable as logic
might suggest. This article examines the general requirements of deductibility
for losses caused by governmental action. Such requirements are synthesized
from an analysis of the Internal Revenue Code, an Internal Revenue Service
memorandum, and the applicable case law. Finally, the deregulation of Florida
motor carriers is used as a case study for analyzing the deductibility of deregulation losses, offering insight into both the tax economics of deregulation
and the supporting policies.
THE GENESIS

OF ADMINISTRATIVELY CREATED VALUE

Pursuant to Chapter 323, the Public Service Commission (P.S.C.) issued
certificates of public necessity and convenience.5 As a prerequisite to the operation of commercial motor transport within Florida, these certificates created
state assured monopolies for the specific route or service. The certificates were
not for a term certain but continued in force until amended or cancelled by
the P.S.C.e Like other business assets, these certificates were transferrable or
saleable.7 Thus, the certificates were clearly intangible assets with a demonstrable and often substantial value. The cost of a certificate was a function
either of the expense of its purchase from a prior holder" or the capitalized expenses of procuring the certificate directly from the P.S.C. The latter expenses
included application costs, legal fees, and associated outlays necessary to generate the franchise. 9 Common carriers properly considered the certificates busi5. FzA. STAT. §323.03(5) (1979) (repealed 1980). The P.S.C. was not authorized to issue
more than one certificate of public necessity to service a given territory or route unless the
existing holder of a certificate failed to provide necessary services and facilities required by the
commission. Id.
6. The form for certificates issued by the P.S.C. states on its face, "This Certificate shall
remain in force and effect until amended, suspended, cancelled or revoked by Order of this
Commission."
7. Under the former statute, a certificate could not be transferred or assigned absent an
application to the P.S.C. and the opportunity for the public or competitors to file objections
and to obtain a hearing before the commission. FLA. STAT. §323.041 (1979) (repealed 1980).
Despite the administrative restrictions imposed on transfer, the statutory procedures for assigning the certificates indicate their transferable nature. Thus, the certificates were intangible
business assets generally similar to leases, contract rights, patents and other intangibles. The
primary distinction, if any, between governmental franchises and other intangibles seems to
lie solely in the state's involvement, both as a regulator and monopoly guarantor.
8. In the case of a purchase of a certificate, its cost basis was properly determined under
§1012. Often, the certificates are acquired as part of a going business. In the absence of an
express allocation of the purchase price, the cost basis attributable to the certificate must be
determined by allocation of the total purchase price among all the assets acquired in proportion to their relative fair market values. Reg. §1.61-6. Documenting the cost basis of a
certificate previously acquired in a business purchase may, in fact, prove to be a signal difficulty in deducting the "deregulation loss." See note 27 and accompanying text, infra.
9. Reg. §1.263(a)-2.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss5/6

2

Salley: Federal Tax Implications of Administrative Reform: Dealing with D
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.XXXUI

ness assets with a book value reflecting the acquisition expense. As a result of
the deregulation legislation, these certificates have become non-assets and must
realistically be removed from the books of the corporation.
The elimination of this asset from the corporate records clearly represents
an economic loss. This loss is presumably deductible under section 165 of the
Internal Revenue Code. 10 If the deduction is permitted, the deregulated carrier
would be partially recompensed for its franchise expenses through tax savings.11
RECOVERING THE COST OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTERVENTION

The expenses incurred in acquiring or establishing a governmental franchise are generally recovered, in a tax sense, in one of three ways. Current expenses, such as legal or accounting fees incurred to comply with administra2
tive regulations, are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.1
13
Although capital expenses may not be recouped through immediate write-off,'
if the franchise is of limited duration then the capital cost of acquisition may
be amortized and deducted over the life of the intangible asset. 14 Most governmental franchises, however, are not so limited, either because of an indefinite
period of issue or because the licensing agency renews franchises on a practically automatic basis.'- The indefiniteness of the term of the intangible's useful life precludes both amortization and current deduction of the acquisition
expenses. Consequently, the cost basis is simply carried forward, unreduced by
any depreciation or amortization deduction. 6 The license usually represents a
continuing asset on the corporate balance sheet. The final method of cost recovery can only occur upon either sale' 7 or termination of the license.8
The prime cause of license termination is a change in governmental regulation. Deregulation wholly destroys the value of the franchise, leaving a section
165 ordinary loss deduction as the sole means of cost recovery. If the loss is not
10. Id. §1.165-2(a).
11. The allowance of a taxable loss does not assure the taxpayer any benefit whatsoever
unless there is sufficient current taxable income to be reduced by the allowable deduction.
Further, the economic benefit of the taxable loss will fluctuate with the marginal tax bracket
of the particular taxpayer involved, granting a proportionately larger benefit to high bracket
taxpayers. Thus, a small corporate taxpayer may be said to "recoup" its deregulation expenses only to the extent of 17% if it is in the minimum corporate tax bracket, while a larger
corporation may enjoy a recoupment approaching 50%, taking into account the maximum
corporate tax rates and potential state income tax savings.
12. I.R.C. §162.
13. I.R.C. §263.
14. See, e.g., Morris Nachman, 12 T.C. 1204 (1949).
15. See Rev. Rul. 56-520, 1956-2 C.B. 520; Rev. Rul. 65-228, 1965-2. C.B. 43; Tube Bar,
Inc., 15 T.C. 922 (1950).
16. In general, no reduction in a certificate's cost basis will occur under I.R.C. §1001
unless there are adjustments to basis for either depreciation or amortization or for some other
recovery of capital. However, the cost basis may well increase under I.R.C. §1016 as the result
of capital expenses to protect the certificate.
17. I.R.C. §1001. To the extent that the purchase price for the license is reduced by its
cost basis, taxable gain to the taxpayer on the transaction is reduced.
18. Reg. §1.165-2(a). When a license is terminated, the full cost basis should be deductible
against ordinary income.
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deductible, no tax recovery of money spent in the production of income will
occur, distorting the traditional concept of taxing only net profit.9
DEREGULATION AND SECTION

165

The statutory provisions and the Treasury's regulations interpreting those
provisions set out a number of tests for determining whether a loss is properly
deductible. However, these tests are not entirely attuned to the deregulation
phenomenon, which destroys the value of intangible assets produced by government sanctioned monopolies or franchises.
A properly deductible loss requires:
(i) An actualloss of a business asset...20
(ii) Reduced by a reimbursement, recoupment, or insurance, 21 and...
by a completed transactionand fixed by identi(iii) The loss is evidenced
22
fiable events.
These generalized prerequisites to deduction have been explored at great
length in the existing case law, providing some certainty with respect to more
common types of loss. Consider, however, the inapplicability of such terms to
a program of legislative deregulation.
Actual Loss
The case law under section 165 indicates that a mere paper loss not reflective of actual economic loss will not support a deduction.23 In the circumstance
of deregulation, one wonders whether the elimination of an overseeing governmental bureaucracy constitutes a loss of any sort, actual or not. The change
of status from a regulated to an deregulated industry is not the type of transaction which traditionally gives rise to a deductible loss. Thus, the Internal
Revenue Service may be reluctant to accept sizable deductions premised on
the bare fact of statutory deregulation.
Completed Transaction
Generally a loss is triggered by the sale of an asset or its retirement from
economic utility and subsequent loss of value.24 In both instances, there is a
19. The concept of taxing net income (taxing only profit after proper reduction of gross
receipts for the expenses of generating the income) has always presented difficulties when any
asset, like the certificates of public convenience, cannot be depreciated or amortized due to a
lack of a determinable useful life. The absence of a clear projection of the asset's useful life
denies proportionate deductibility for the acquisition expenditure, any tax recovery for the
eventual and inevitable valuelessness of that asset must occur in a single shot upon the
termination of its use in business. Thus, the nondepreciable or non-amortizable asset distorts
the concept of taxable income in any circumstances by lumping into a single taxable year
the total recovery of a business expenditure producing income over many years.
20. Reg. §1.165-1(b) (emphasis added).
21. Id. §1.165-1(c)(4).
22. Id. §1.165-1(d) (emphasis added).
23. The test for "actual loss" was stated in J. G. Boswell Co., 34 T.C. 539 (1960), aff 'd,
302 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 860 (1962): "It is vital to a loss that something of value be parted with, i.e., the petitioner must have suffered a 'loss' in the economic
sense. Bookkeeping entries and paper losses are not sufficient." Id. at 545.
24. See, e.g., Morris Nachman, 12 T.C. 1204 (1949); Rev. Rul. 70-248, 1970-1 C.B. 172.
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clear and distinct transaction which identifies and quantifies the loss. The
process of deregulation may not provide unambiguous declarations that
specified governmental franchises are, as of a specified date, worthless. Rather,
legislative deregulation may subtly modify the jurisdiction of administrative
agencies, constrict their rule-making authority, or provide broader exemptions
25
from franchise or registration requirements.
The potential problem with deducting deregulation losses under the actual
loss and completed transaction tests is complicated by an additional conceptual
issue: to what extent can legislative activity which reduces the value of "governmental assets" be permitted to give rise to a compensating tax benefit. Or,
stated another way, is there or should there be some public policy impediment
to a tax recovery for the loss of a government sanctioned monopoly. The existing case law provides insufficient guidance for the resolution of the issue.
Loss

THROUGH GOVERNMENTAL

AcrION

In the 1939 case of Consolidated FreightLines, Inc. v. Commissioner,26 the
Ninth Circuit established a rationale which may be the focus of future controversies surrounding deregulation losses.2 7 A motor carrier held a certificate
25. The statutory form of deregulation may be of great importance, particularly in light
of the Internal Revenue Service's strict interpretation regarding the elimination of an asset
from productive life and hence the justification of an identifiable loss. See text accompanying
notes 46 & 47 infra. For instance, Congress has substantially reduced the regulatory authority
of the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) over motor carriers under the Motor Carrier
Act of 1980. That legislation was intended to eliminate quasi-monopolistic rights arising under
the ICC permitting system for authorized carriers. The legislative history supporting that Act
states:
"With respect to operating rights, the Committee intends to oversee the effect of this legislation on their value. Should it become apparent that the effect of this legislation has been
to substantially erode the value of operating rights, then appropriate relief for such results
should be considered, as early as possible. Preferably it will be considered by the Committee
on Ways and Means." H.R. REP. No. 96-1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in (1980)
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4109, 4112.
Implicit in this language is a recognition that the simple erosion of the value of operating
rights will not, without subsequent legislation, result in any recognizable tax loss to the
deregulated carriers. In fact, legislation to make such losses deductible has been submitted to
the House Committee on Ways and Means although, to date, it has not been acted upon.
26. 101 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 562 (1942).
27. The loss occasioned by the deregulation process will hereinafter be referred to as a
"deregulation loss." Needless to say, that term has no import other than as a shorthand for
the alleged or real reduction in value of governmental licenses and other franchises by virtue
of statutory revision. It is at least possible to have "deregulation gains"; that is, an increase
in the economic value of a business's governmental licenses by the reduction of certain restrictions on their scope. For instance, the elimination of territorial restrictions of a regulated
business could significantly increase the value of existing certificates to larger businesses suddenly freed from limited markets. Interestingly, there is no mechanism within the Internal
Revenue Code for triggering a realized gain to the industry so benefited, while there is, at
least in certain circumstances, a deductible loss to those industries whose certificates are
rendered worthless.
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of public convenience and necessity from the state of Washington to engage in

the business of transporting persons and property on specified routes within
that state. Although the certificate simply authorized the carrier to engage the
transportation business, state statutes prohibited issuance of more than one
cerificate to competing motor carriers. Thus, the certificates had value not only

as a prerequisite to the operation of a transportation business within the state,
but also as a state-provided monopoly. The taxpayer had, in fact, paid a very
substantial premium for the monopoly. Soon after Consolidated purchased the
certificate, the Washington legislature amended the applicable statutes to
remove the limitation on the issuance of certificates for any given route. Thus,

the monopolistic element which represented the bulk of the certificate's value
was destroyed.
In the year of the statutory amendment Consolidated deducted the certificate's full cost basis, arguing that it had suffered a recognizable loss in the value
of the certificates. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deduction. The Ninth Circuit held that the destruction of the monopoly granted
by statute did not constitute a deductible loss, but only a diminution in value
not recognizable for tax purposes. The court reasoned that because the certificate was still a requirement of doing business, it remained in use by the taxpayer. Even though the certificate's true value had been substantially eliminated by statutory amendment, this was insufficient to justify a loss deduction
because the certificates were neither totally obsolete nor completely valueless.
If the ConsolidatedFreightLines court held that the continuing vitality of
the certificates of public convenience negated a complete and recognizable loss,
the case would not represent an unusual extension of the general law underlying section 165. However, after noting that the reduction of value caused by
the loss of the monopolistic portion of the certificate was neither a complete
loss nor a completed transaction the court also noted that
Destruction of the statute which put an end to the monopoly did not
destroy the certificates, nor their value. The thing destroyed was the
right of monopoly conferred by the statute, not by the certificate. What
interest did petitioner have in the rule of law, declared by statute? "No
person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to insist
that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit".... Whatever right the
statute conferred upon petitioner was subject to the right of the state to
change it. When petitioner purchased the certificates, it did not purchase a monopoly, but the means by which it might take advantage of a
monopoly conferred by statute. It now has had no loss of such means,
for they exist now as before. We think petitioner suffered no loss on the
certificates, for the thing destroyed was not a part thereof./The court adopted a mechanical test: so long as the certificates remain in use
there is, by definition, no completed loss deductible under section 165. The
opinion also intimates that public policy justifies denying deductibility to taxpayers based on a reluctance to create fiscal impediments to necessary statutory
amendment. 29 If, as a matter of public policy, an additional hurdle to section
28. 101 F.2d at 814 (citations omitted).
29. Whether or not a taxpayer has a vested right in the statutory status quo is not relevant
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165 deduction exists, then the burden of proving a closed transaction and
actual loss may be heavier than would be the case with other assets.
Such a judicial extension of the statutory language of section 165 may find
some support in the series of cases following prohibition. In those cases the
United States Supreme Court enunciated the general proposition that where
the state legislatures or Congress finds the conduct of a business "noxious" to
public policy, there is no right to a deduction for the loss of goodwill or similar
30
intangibles of businesses closed down by the prohibitory legislation. While
there are very clear differences between seeking a tax deduction for losses incurred from the legislative process of deregulation and the constitutional prohibition of a noxious industry, there are parallels between the two. In both
circumstances a tax deduction constitutes the sole means of recouping money
spent for an intangible asset after it is destroyed by legislation. In both cases
the allowance of such a deduction in a single year is an indirect form of compensation for the legislative activity generating the loss, creating a financial
burden on the federal government for the implementation of reform. Arguably, permitting sizable deductions or other tax benefits to deregulated busi' 1
nesses in effect recognizes a "vested right in the legislative status quo."'
Despite the breadth of the dictum in ConsolidatedFreightLines, subsequent
cases have focused on its narrower holding that a simple reduction in the value
of an intangible right neither extinguishes the right nor generates a recogniz33
able loss. 3 2 For example, in Reporter Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, the
Tenth Circuit decided whether a newspaper could deduct the reduction in value
of a franchise granted by the Associated Press to the taxpayer. The taxpayer
had purchased a newspaper in Kansas, including its franchise with the Associated Press. That franchise was accorded considerable value in purchase
negotiations, because it assured the newspaper that no direct competitors would
be permitted to subscribe to the service. 4 As in ConsolidatedFreightLines, the
taxpayer attempted to deduct approximately $30,000.00 of the $80,000.00 it had
allocated to the Associated Press franchise in its purchase of the newspaper as a

to the question of whether he sustains a recognizable loss upon statutory amendment. Section
165 permits the deduction for "losses," not just for the destruction of "vested" property rights.
There is, however, an irrebuttable economic loss upon the statutory change, whether or not
an enforceable property right was destroyed thereby.
30. See, e.g., Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930).
31. Id. at 386.
32. It is important to note that many cases support loss deductions for brewery equipment, trademarks and similar assets which became valueless upon the adoption of prohibition.
See, e.g., Gambrinus Brewery Co. v. Anderson, 282 U.S. 638 (1931); Elston Co. v. United States,
21 F. Supp. 267 (Ct. Cl. 1937); William Zakon, 7 B.T.A. 687 (1927). These cases indicate that,
where proper substantiation of cost basis is available, a deductible loss caused by dramatic
statutory change has historically been deemed deductible despite any real or imagined impediment to statutory reform.
33. 201 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1953).
34. The Associated Press (A.P.) had established bylaws which prevented the service from
being made available to locally competing newspapers. The United States Supreme Court
subsequently ruled these bylaws illegal as violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act, eliminating
the competitive edge previously accorded A.P. subscribers.
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loss of a business asset. The court, strictly following Consolidated Freight
Lines, held that the continued use of the Associated Press membership by the
newspaper nullified any contention that it was valueless and therefore no deduction was permissible. The loss of the monopolistic benefit concededly reduced the value of the certificate but did not destroy it. In the language of the
then existing Treasury regulations, the franchise had not been so degraded in
value that "the taxpayer discontinues the business or discards such assets
35
permanently from use in such business."
Thus, in Reporter Publishing, as in Consolidated Freight Lines, the continued use of the asset belies any contention that it has been rendered totally
valueless for purposes of affording a loss deduction. The Tenth Circuit did not
address the policy question, gratuitously raised in ConsolidatedFreight Lines,
of whether a complete loss would have been deductible where it was a product
of government deregulation which obliterated the previously sanctioned monopoly.
In 1954, the ConsolidatedFreight Lines decision was given an expansive
interpretation by the Court of Claims. In Chase Candy Co. v. United States,3 6
that court reviewed an attempted deduction by a candy company for a loss
occasioned by the worthlessness of certain purchased intangible commodity
rights. During the Second World War both sugar and chocolate were rationed
to industrial users by the government, which utilized a formula based primarily on consumption prior to rationing. Chase Candy, faced with an inadequate supply of these materials, purchased a division of the National Candy
Company which had, due to its prior production, the right to receive a large
allocation of the commodities. The taxpayer allegedly paid a substantial premium above the true value of the company. It sought to deduct this premium
as a loss in the year that sugar rationing ceased.
The taxpayer opposed the government's motion for summary judgment,
arguing that at trial it could establish the amount paid for the intangible rights
to acquire rationed sugar and chocolate were severable assets purchased in the
business acquisition, and that their obsolescence represented a properly deductible loss. The Court of Claims granted the government's motion reasoning,
as in the ConsolidatedFreight Lines case, that the purchase of the National
Candy Company did not automatically create a vested right to acquire the
rationed commodities, but merely represented an opportunity provided by
statute to participate in the governmentally sanctioned monopoly on the sale
of the commodities involved37 Because a taxpayer cannot have a vested right
in a statutory enactment, the court held that no loss could be deducted upon a
provision's repeal.38
35. 201 F.2d at 744.
36. 126 F. Supp. 521 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
37. Id. at 523.
58. d.at 525-26. "Mhe assets purchased by plaintiff from National did not include the

thing which was destroyed, and which was of value for a time to plaintiff, i.e., the monopoly."
Id. at 526. With respect to the Chase Candy case it is essential to keep in mind that the taxpayer was arguing its position on a motion for summary judgment. Chase Candy may have
been able to establish, as is conceded by the court, that it separately negotiated its purchase
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Significantly, the Chase Candy court granted the Commissioner's motion
for summary judgment even though the monopolistic right could have been
properly treated as an independent asset and may have had a clearly demonstrable cost basis, and even though it was indisputably worthless following the
repeal of the rationing statute and regulations.39 The court did not address
the question of where the value of those intangibles went. An asset was purchased by the taxpayer, presumably accounted for as an asset with an identifiable value, and later was removed from the corporate records following the end
of rationing. The court offered no guidance as to whether the amounts paid
for the intangibles should be treated as goodwill, reallocated among the other
assets acquired in the purchase, or simply ignored. Rather, the court merely
quoted from the United States Supreme Court decision in Weiss v. Wiener4o
that "[t]he income tax laws do not profess to embody perfect economic theory.
They ignore some things that either a theorist or a business man would take
1
into account in determining the pecuniary condition of the taxpayer." 4 Certainly this statement is of limited comfort to the taxpayer who paid a premium
for an asset subsequently rendered valueless by a change of statute, and for
which no recoupment can be made, either by sale to a third party or through
42
tax recovery.
Finally in 1966 the Tax Court, again relying on ConsolidatedFreightLines
and Reporter Publishing Company,4 3 ruled that a reduction in the value of a
governmental franchise which did not totally destroy its utility in the business
could not represent a closed transaction and therefore was not a deductible
loss under section 165. 44 In Monroe W. Beatty4" that court reviewed a proposed
deduction by the taxpayer for the reduction in value of liquor licenses issued
by the state of Arizona. Prior to 1961 Arizona had strictly limited the number
of liquor licenses available and, therefore, the licenses could be held as investments. The licenses had historically appreciated steadily in value, primarily
of the business from its purchase price of the intangible right to acquire rationed commodities.
39. The fact that the court was unwilling to permit the taxpayer to prove these assertions indicates that it apparently believed, as a matter of law, that the loss of a monopolistic
right cannot constitute an asset giving rise to a deductible loss under the Internal Revenue
Code.
40. 279 U.S. 333 (1929).
41. Id. at 335.
42. 126 F. Supp. at 526. Of particular interest in the Chase Candy decision is the brief
dissenting opinion of Judge Madden, who noted: "The case of Consolidated Freight Lines v.
Commissioner, discussed in the opinion of the court, does not seem to me to have been rightly
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals. If, in fact, one has paid for a license or franchise,
whether he has paid for it to a city or state, or to an owner of a business to which the right is
appurtenant because of some "grandfather" provision in the applicable laws, he is out the
money, and if, by reason of a change in the laws, he loses the monopoly granted by the licensor
franchise, I see no reason why his true status should not be recognized by the tax authority."
Id. (emphasis added).
43. The court did not cite Chase Candy; in fact the rationale of that case has not yet been
adopted by any court.
44. Monroe W. Beatty, 46 T.C. 835 (1966).
45. Id.
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because the licenses were freely transferrable. In 1961 the state amended its
regulations, greatly increasing the availability of liquor licenses and limiting
their transferrability. Both of these changes severely decreased the value of the
liquor licenses.
The taxpayer sought to deduct a portion of his liquor license's purchase
price on the theory that the licenses actually represented a bundle of rights
independently purchased. Because some of those rights had been rendered
totally valueless by the change in legislation, the taxpayer argued that their
loss was separately deductible.- The government, however, contended that the
liquor license was an inseparable asset which was still being used in the taxpayer's business. Therefore, the license was not valueless and, hence, there was
no identifiable and recognizable loss to support any deduction.4r Denying the
deduction to the taxpayer, the court held that the monopolistic benefit of a
governmental franchise was not an asset independent of the right to carry on
business, that the taxpayer continued to use its certificate in the business, and
therefore no dosed transaction had occurred to generate any tax loss. 48
Like its predecessors, the Beatty decision holds that for a deductible loss to
occur due to changes in statutes or regulations, the intangible asset must be
totally destroyed and absolutely eliminated from continuing vitality in the
business. Furthermore, to constitute a deductible loss, the worthlessness cannot
be a product of a mere change in governmental policy or police power activity,
regardless of the actual economic loss occasioned by the change. The Internal
Revenue Service has fully adopted this interpretation of section 165.
In a technical advice memorandum 49 issued in 1977, the Service considered
the deductibility of a loss in value of selling time used in the marketing of
tobacco in North Carolina. In a situation very similar to that in Chase Candy,
tobacco warehouses were permitted time to sell their tobacco at state run
auctions based on a formula which took into account the floor space owned and
46. The argument that an asset can be divided into innumerable individual rights, any
one of which may independently become valueless and give rise to a deductible loss, is obviously antagonistic to the concept of requiring total worthlessness before permitting a loss
deduction under §165. The Beatty court, while supporting the service's contention that an
asset must become worthless in its totality, may, on the other hand, have accepted an overbroad statement of the law. If, for instance, what appears to be a single asset was purchased
as a composite of rights with a provable cost basis allocated to each component, then there
appears to be no reason to prohibit the deduction of a loss of one of the components. See
Parmelee Transp. Co. v. United States, 851 F.2d 619 (Ct. Cl. 1965), for the proposition that

an intangible such as the business good will, need not necessarily be an indivisible asset as
long as a proper cost allocation can be proven. This may represent the very bundle of separate
rights conceptually rejected by the Beatty court.

47. Id. at 838-9. The court reiterated that a governmental franchise "is merely a permit
granted by the sovereign to carry on business subject to regulation and modification under
its police power." Id. at 839.
48. Id. at 840-42.
49. A technical advice memorandum is merely one interpretation of the Internal Revenue
laws as adopted by the National Office of the Internal Revenue Service at the request of a

district office. The memorandum is not entitled to precendential weight, but it is indicative of
national IRS policy, and as such, represents a position from which the service would have
some difficulty in receding therefrom. Reg. §601.106(f).
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operated by each warehouseman. Selling time was considered a valuable commodity to be exchanged by warehousemen through the purchase or lease of
warehouse space. In 1974, the United States Department of Agriculture promulgated regulations which established a new method of allocating selling time,
effectively eliminating the value of warehouse floor space as a factor in obtaining selling time. A taxpayer had a substantial investment in warehouse
space purchased to obtain selling time, and sought to deduct the premium paid
for the space as a loss in 1974.
The technical advice memorandum reviewed the Consolidated Freight
Lines, ReporterPublishing Company, and Beatty cases and determined that no
deduction was permissible for the alleged loss. The Internal Revenue Service
noted that in each of those cases although governmental action diminished the
value of a severable asset, it nonetheless retained some utility in the business
following the supposed loss. Thus, as in those cases, the technical advice finally
determined that
As long as [the warehouseman] continues to own or hold leaseholds on
warehouses in its business of operating tobacco warehouses, [the warehouseman], like the taxpayers in the cases discussed above, will be using
in its business the larger asset of which the purportedly severable asset is
a part.
In each of the cases discussed above, the courts determined that the
asset for which taxpayer had claimed a loss was not severable from the
larger asset of which it is a part. From the discussion of the cases, it can
be seen that selling time possesses the same qualities as the monopolistic
rights in ConsolidatedFreightLines and Reporter Pub. Co. and the intangible rights attached to the liquor license in Beatty. Likewise, the
selling time acquired by [the warehouseman] in the 1970 transaction is
not severable from [the warehouseman's] feehold or leasehold interest
in warehouses. Since the selling time is not severable, there will be no
closed and completed transaction within the Section 1.165-1 of the regulations for as long as [the warehouseman] continues to own or hold
leases on warehouses in its business of operating tobacco auction warehouses5 0
A

SYNTHESIS

Synthesis of the cases and the technical advice memorandum discussed above
initially appears simple. For a business to be able to enjoy a tax recoupment
for its deregulation losses, the burden is on the taxpayer 5' to establish that the
process of deregulation not only caused an actual economic loss52 but also a
50. Private Letter Ruling 7744008 (July 28, 1977).
51. As with all matters pertaining to tax computation, other than fraud, the taxpayer
carries the burden of proof in establishing his right to deductible loss under §165. However,
the stringency of the regulations concerning proof of a total loss as a condition precedent to
any deduction seems to have pushed that burden of proof further than is necessarily required
by the language of the statute itself. A similar extension by the service in the area of losses
of governmental sanctions through deregulation could effect a similar increase in the taxpayers' burden, resulting in administrative amendment to §165.
52. See text accompanying note 20, supra.
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recognizable tax loss.5 3 The devaluation will not generate a taxable loss unless
it is total. So long as the asset remains either a legal prerequisite to continuing
the business of the taxpayer as in Consolidated Freight Lines, or remains a
functioning asset of any economic value whatsoever to the business, as in Reporter Publishing Company, the loss will not be deemed to have been generated by a closed transaction64 and may not be recognized. To the extent the
taxpayer can establish the complete loss of a governmental franchise, whether
a product of legislative action or not, strong authority exists for the deduction.
Unfortunately, dictum suggests that the obsolescence of an intangible asset
granted by a governmental entity is different from other intangibles. This
proposition is based on the theory that the public policy against shackling
legislatures to a statutory status quo prevents an intangible asset from being
considered a vested property interest of a taxpayer. Although the Internal
Revenue Service in its technical advice memorandum does not cite such dicta,
that the loss to the tobacco warehouseman was a function of governmental
activity seemed to be of special significance. 5 Nevertheless, after noting that
fact, the memorandum proceeds to analyze the law strictly within the traditional terms of section 165 and, in particular, on the basis of the requirement
of a dosed transaction without further averting to the governmental cause of
the loss.
THE FLORmA EXPERmNCE

Given the status of the law with respect to deregulation losses and the
necessity for an absolute loss of the value of the governmental franchise under
section 165, the effect of Florida's repeal of Chapter 323 on the taxable incomes
of deregulated industries appears to be relatively dear. The deregulation resulting from sunset legislation, which simply excises the statutory authority
for regulatory bodies,5 6 fits squarely within the cases and regulations discussed
53. See text accompanying note 22, supra.
54. The legislative history to the Motor Carriers Act of 1980 acknowledges the need for
additional legislation to permit recognition of partial losses through deregulation, indicating
the breadth of the role that the closed transaction requirement has assumed. See note 25 supra.
As a condition to deductibility, it is one thing to require a transaction be dosed so as to
identify a completed loss, but quite another to require that an integrated asset be totally
eliminated from any function, however minor, in the business operations of a taxpayer. In
both Consolidated Freight Lines and Reporter Publishing Co., an allegedly indivisible asset
remained in nominal use in business operations and hence no deductible loss was permitted.
The Parmelee case implies that there may be a single asset which is still divisible for loss
purposes, drawing into some suspicion the categorical stance assumed by the IRS in this re-

gard. See note 46 supra.
55. The technical advice memorandum initially noted concern with cases dealing primarily with losses engendered by governmental activity, but failed to return to that theme
in its analysis. This is somewhat puzzling, the same result could have been supported by
numerous cases dealing with losses outside the governmental context. Thus, the memorandum
leaves open the issue of whether or not deregulation losses may, in fact, constitute a special
subclass of losses under §165.
56. The Sunset law repeals the subject statutes in their entirety rather than merely modifying or amending them. Compare this with the less drastic deregulation occasioned by the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980. See note 25 supra. Under the rationale espoused by the IRS and
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above. The certificates of public convenience and necessity formerly required
of common carriers are now not only valueless as economic assets, but are
totally meaningless as legal documents. Unlike the situation in Consolidated
Freight Lines where the certificates were merely reduced in value by the loss
of some monopolistic benefit, the repeal of Chapter 323 renders the certificates
nothing more than legal anachronisms.
In order to deny the deductibility of any remaining cost basis the carriers
had in those certificates, the Service must argue that either public policy denies
any loss generated by legislative or administrative change, or that the monies
expended in creating and maintaining governmental franchises during a
period of deregulation continue to benefit the business after deregulation. The
first assertion, while arguably supported by weak dictum in the cases cited
above, is inimical to economic reality and existing law. The second contention
also appears untenable: after complete deregulation those expenditures cannot
be logically recharacterized as having been made for the creation of general
business goodwill or to enhance "going concern" value.
CONCLUSION

The apparent clarity of the deductibility of deregulation losses in the context of the repeal of Chapter 323 does not necessarily assure the same for other
forms of deregulation. In fact, administrative reform of any sort, short of absolute repeal of the statutory underpinnings for a regulatory agency, is virtually
certain to raise the issues confronted in ConsolidatedFreight Lines. The Service's position has been consistent: as long as any vestige of a governmental
franchise remains, however denuded of value it may have been by deregulation, no loss will be recognized. Thus, the elimination of all barriers to the
entry into a regulated business, other than simple registration, may even be a
sufficient continuation of the necessity for a governmental franchise to deny
deductibility due to a lack of a closed transaction.
Regulated industries may now face a Hobson's choice. The desire of regulated industries to maintain at least some portion of the mini-monopolies
granted them by regulatory structure, is tempered by the fact that partial deregulation will generate a sizable economic loss without economic or tax recoupment. Deregulation lobbyists should be cognizant that a compromise which
removes some of the entry barriers into regulated industries while simultaneously preserving aspects of the regulatory structure presents the risk of losing a
real and valuable asset, a protected marketplace, without an offset for recoupment of loss.
its technical advice memorandum, it appears unquestionable that the cost basis to Florida
motor carriers for their certificates of public convenience and necessity from the FPSC can be
deducted as losses in 1980. Logically, though somewhat inconsistent, those same carriers who
suffered significant devaluation of their certificates from the Interstate Commerce Commission
by virtue of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 do not appear to qualify for any lost deduction
absent remedial legislation. For instance, one carrier had assets of $46 million prior to the
deregulation, it suffered an $18 million loss upon enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of
1980 through devaluation of its certificates. NATION'S BusINEss, Oct. 1980, at 46. One may well
wonder whether that $18 million loss was any more real in the context of "creeping" federal
deregulation as opposed to the Florida legislature's more heavy-handed approach.
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